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Abstract
Survey studies on exchange rate expectations tend to reject the rational expectations hypothesis for
longer horizons. Extrapolative, adaptive and regressive expectations have been tested as alternatives,
usually rejecting static expectations. The purpose of this paper is to investigate the plausibility of
these alternative exchange rate expectations mechanisms in an artificial economy with traders which
are heterogeneous in initial endowments, risk aversion and use of information. Artificial markets
which consist of either extrapolative or adaptive expectations traders fail to reproduce statistical
properties that are characteristic for empirical quarterly exchange rate series, while artificial markets
with regressive expectations traders often succeed. Adaptive expectations markets are rarely weak-
form efficient. Extrapolative expectations markets may be weak-form efficient, but generate too
many extreme returns to be empirically plausible. Regressive expectations markets often produce
exchange rate series that are similar to empirical data. The (perceived) existence of an ‘anchor’
seems to play an important role in the functioning of foreign exchange markets, determining the
frequency of extreme exchange rate returns. (JEL F31)
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1. Exchange rate expectations
Survey data studies indicate that long term exchange rate expectations are heterogeneous (Taylor &
Allen (1992), Ito (1990)) and are not adequately described by rational expectations (Dominguez
(1986), Frankel & Froot (1987a), Froot & Frankel (1989), Ito (1990), Cavaglia, Verschoor &
Wolff (1993)). Extrapolative, adaptive and regressive expectations have been tested as alternatives,
against which static expectations are usually rejected (Frankel & Froot (1987a) and (1987b), Bank
of Japan (1989), Froot & Frankel (1990), Cavaglia, Verschoor & Wolff (1993)). The objective of
this paper is to investigate the plausibility of these alternative exchange rate expectations mechanisms
in an artificial economy with traders which are heterogeneous in initial endowments, risk aversion and
use of information. We will focus on three months ahead exchange rate expectations, as survey
evidence is most elaborate for this horizon. The alternative expectations schemes (extrapolative,
adaptive and regressive expectations) can be summarized (Frankel & Froot (1987a)) as:
Et,i(st+1) = (1-at,i) st + at,i zt,i                                                                                                    (1)
where st is the natural logarithm of the spot exchange rate St in period t and Et,i(.) denotes trader i’s
period t (not necessarily mathematical) expectation with respect to the variable between brackets. If
zt,i = st-1 we speak of extrapolative expectations. We distinguish between three cases: at,i < 0
(bandwagon expectations), at,i = 0 (static expectations) and at,i > 0 (distributed lag expectations).
Another scheme that is “technical” or “chartist” in nature is adaptive expectations: zt,i = Et-1,i(st). It is
straightforward to show that such traders use the entire history of the exchange rate and that the
forecast follows from a geometric series.3
If zt,i = qt,i is the natural logarithm of some “fundamental” or “long run equilibrium” exchange rate
Qt,i, we speak of regressive expectations.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we introduce the artificial economy approach that will
be used to perform controlled experiments with exchange rate expectations. In section 3 we describe
a theoretical model of foreign exchange between heterogeneous traders with extrapolative, adaptive
and regressive expectations. In section 4 we assign empirically plausible parameter and initial values
to the theoretical model, which is thus transformed into an artificial economy. In section 5 we use this
artificial economy as a foreign exchange laboratory: we perform simulations for different
specifications of exchange rate expectations. In section 6 we draw conclusions from the controlled
experiments in section 5.
2. The artificial economy approach
An important objection against the use of survey data is the uncertainty concerning the truthfulness of
the participants’ reporting. As Frankel & Froot (1987a) put it:
“Economists generally distrust survey data. It is a cornerstone of “positive economics” that we learn more by
observing what people do in the marketplace than what they say.”
A related objection may be that the expectations of a participant at the time that he answers the
survey, may differ from his expectations at the time at which he performs a market transaction.
Especially when we are interested in the relationship between exchange rate expectations and the4
actual exchange rate, this nonsynchronicity with market data may limit the appropriate use of survey
data.
A more controlled environment could be obtained with an experimental foreign exchange market.
We could then solve the nonsynchronicity problem by asking participants about their expectations at
the moment that they perform a transaction. However, we would still be uncertain about the
truthfulness of the participants’ reporting. In other words, with real people a perfectly controlled
experiment is not feasible when expectations, perceptions and preferences are variables that we are
interested in.
This problem can be solved by performing experiments with “artificial people”, i.e. by performing
computer simulations with agents whose behavior exactly follows the mathematical description that
we impose via the program. In this way we know with certainty what the expectations of the
participants are at the time of transaction.
The idea of this “artificial economy approach” is to simulate a theoretical model for empirically
plausible parameter and initial values and study which theoretical assumptions lead or do not lead to
statistical regularities in the generated time series that match empirically observed regularities. We
have depicted this in figure 1:5
Figure 1: Artificial economy methodology
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Backus, Gregory & Telmer (1993) formally define the concept of an artificial economy:
“ . . . we build what has come to be called an artificial economy - a numerical representation of the theory whose
properties can be compared to those observed in the data.”
Notice that not all numerical representations of theoretical models are artificial economies: only if the
assigned numerical values are empirically plausible, do we speak of an artificial economy.
Artificial economies based on the representative agent model of asset pricing - such as Backus,
Gregory & Zin (1989), Macklem (1991) and Backus, Gregory & Telmer (1993) - have not (yet)
been very successful in reproducing empirically plausible time series. One way to investigate the6
plausibility of alternative exchange rate expectations mechanisms is to relax the rational expectations
assumption of the representative agent model. However, the survey evidence that we mentioned in
section 1 suggests that exchange rate expectations are neither rational nor homogeneous. Hence we
will also relax the representative agent assumption and build a model of foreign exchange between
heterogeneous traders that do not necessarily form rational expectations. Since we are interested in
the plausibility of alternative exchange rate expectations mechanisms, we would like to have a model
that has the flexibility to incorporate all three alternatives (extrapolative, adaptive and regressive). We
can then perform simulations with different versions of the model, corresponding with different
specifications of the expectations mechanism. With the validity of the model as a maintained
hypothesis, we can interpret the (in)ability of a model version to generate empirically plausible output
as evidence of the (im)plausibility of the corresponding exchange rate expectations mechanism. The
artificial economy can be used as a laboratory of foreign exchange that allows us to perform
controlled experiments with exchange rate expectations.
3. A model of foreign exchange between heterogeneous traders
3.1 Traders, currency positions and interest rates
Consider an international banking system that organizes a one period domestic money market, a one
period foreign money market and a spot foreign exchange market that allows traders to exchange
domestic currency money market accounts for foreign currency money market accounts and vice
versa. Suppose domestic trader i (foreign trader j) starts the trading session in period t with an7
account of At,i (A*t,j) domestic currency units and Bt,i (B*t,j) foreign currency units. Trading allows
him to change his idle account (At,i, Bt,i) ( (A*t,j,B*t,j) ) into an interest-bearing account (Xt,i, Yt,i) (
(X*t,j,Y*t,j) ). In period t+1 the domestic currency wealth of domestic trader i will be
Wt+1,i   =  (1 + It) Xt,i   +  (1 + I*t) Yt,i St+1                                                                                                         (2)
The period t+1 foreign currency wealth of foreign trader j will be
W*t+1,j   =  (1 + I*t) Yt,i   +  (1 + It) X*t,j /St+1                                                                          (3)
The participation of domestic trader i in the foreign exchange market will have to satisfy
Xt,i   + St Yt,i   =   At,i   + St Bt,i                                                                                                                                (4)
Therefore we may rewrite the domestic currency wealth of domestic trader i in period t+1 as follows
Wt+1,i   =   [ (1 + I*t) St+1  -   (1 + It) St  ] Yt,i    +   (1 + It) ( At,i + St Bt,i)                                 (5)
Analogously, the exchange of foreign trader j has to obey
X*t,j/St  +  Y*t,j   =   A*t,j/St  + B*t,j                                                                                                                      (6)
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Before trading the international banking system as a whole (we assume that there are m domestic
traders and n foreign traders) has a domestic currency balance
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After trading the international banking system as a whole has a domestic currency balance
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The international banking system guarantees its account holders that they will be able to attain any
interest-bearing domestic and foreign currency account balance they like. This requires that
Xt = At  ￿  Yt = Bt                                                                                                                                                      (12)
For simplicity we assume that domestic and foreign interest rates are exogeneously given. Hence the
exchange rate St simultaneously clears the two money markets and the foreign exchange market if it
ensures that both conditions in (12) are met. Since the domestic and foreign currency positions of
domestic and foreign traders are interdependent via their respective budget equations, Walras’ Law
tells us that we only have to solve St from one of the two conditions. We assume that the international
banking system knows the foreign currency supply and demand schedules of all its clients and is thus
able to act as a Walrasian auctioneer by announcing a clearing exchange rate St.
3.2 Currency endowments
For simplicity we assume that for all t > 1:
At,i = (1+It-1)Xt-1,i                                                                                                                                                         (13)
B*t,j  = (1+I*t-1)Y*t-1,j                                                                                                                                                 (14)10
A*t,j = (1+It-1)X*t-1,j                                                                                                                                                       (15)
Bt,i = (1+I*t-1)Yt-1,i                                                                                                                    (16)
where A1,i, B*1,j, A*1,j, B1,i are exogeneously given initial values.
It follows from the market clearing conditions that between period t-1 and t the domestic and foreign
currency stocks in the international banking system evolve according to
Xt = (1+It-1)Xt-1                                                                                                                       (17)
Yt = (1+I*t-1)Yt-1                                                                                                                                                       (18)
The international banking system creates domestic (foreign) money at a rate that equals the domestic
(foreign) interest rate.
3.3 Trader preferences and demand functions
Let Et,i(St+1) denote the expectation of domestic trader i in period t concerning the yet unknown
future value St+1 and let Vart,i(St+1) be the variance of St+1 that domestic trader i predicts in period t.
Given a certain value of exchange rate St, it follows from (5) that domestic trader i expects his
domestic currency wealth in period t+1 to be11
Et,i(Wt+1,i)   =   [ (1 + I*t) Et,i(St+1)  -  (1 + It) St ] Yt,i   +   (1+ It) ( At,i + St Bt,i)                     (19)
and he expects the variance of his period t+1 domestic currency wealth to be
Vart,i(Wt+1,i)   =   (1+I*t)2 Vart,i(St+1) Yt,i2                                                                             (20)
Assume that domestic traders are only interested in their one period ahead domestic currency
wealth. The one period horizon can be induced by an overlapping generations structure in the spirit
of De Long, Shleifer, Summers & Waldmann (1990):
“Such an overlapping generations structure may be a fruitful way of modeling the effects on prices of a number of
institutional features, such as frequent evaluations of money managers’ performance, that may lead rational, long-
lived market participants to care about short-term rather than long-term performance.”
The evaluation of wealth in terms of domestic currency may be justified by assuming that domestic
traders only consume domestic goods. A convenient specification of the expected utility function
(Newbery (1988)) is
E U E W Var W t i t i t i t i t i t i t i , , , , , , , ( ) ( ) ( ) + + + = - 1 1
1
2 1 g                                                             (21)
where gt,i is the parameter of absolute risk aversion.
If we substitute (19) and (20) into expected utility function (21), we obtain12
Et,i(Ut+1,i)   =   [ (1+I*t) Et,i(St+1) - (1 + It) St ] Yt,i   +  (1+It)(At,i + StBt,i)   +
                       - 1/2 gt,i (1+I*t)2 Vart,i(St+1) Yt,i
2                                                                                           
(22)
Hence the optimal foreign currency position of domestic trader i is
Y
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provided that gt,i > 0 (second order condition). Let E S t j t ,
* ( ) +
-
1
1  denote the subjective expectation of
foreign trader j in period t with respect to the unknown future exchange rate 1/St+1 and let
Var S t j t ,
* ( ) +
-
1
1  be the variance of 1/St+1 that foreign trader j expects in period t. Given a certain value
of exchange rate St, it follows from (7) that foreign trader j expects his foreign currency wealth in
period t+1 to be
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and he expects the variance of his period t+1 foreign currency wealth to be
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Denote foreign trader j’s absolute risk aversion in period t as g t j ,
* . We assume that foreign traders
are only interested in their one period ahead foreign currency wealth and that they maximize the
following expected utility function:
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If we substitute (24) and (25) into (26), we get
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provided that  g t j ,
* > 0 (second order condition). The foreign trader’s demand for foreign currency
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From (23) and (29) we obtain the aggregate excess demand for foreign currency:
F( )
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3.4 Exchange rate expectations
Assume the following specification of expectations formation:
E S S Z t i t t t i
t i t i , , ( ) , , +
- = 1
1 a a                                                                                                    (31)
E S S Z t j t t t j
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The variance specifications (33)-(34) reflect a variance of St+1/St which - conditional on all
information in period t -  does not change over time. This is appropriate if one period is interpreted
as one month or longer (for our purposes: three months): Baillie & Bollerslev (1989) found that
ARCH effects in daily and weekly exchange rates seem to disappear for monthly exchange rates.
Definition 1 (Heterogeneous traders market)
A heterogeneous traders market is a market consisting of
m ( ‡ 1 ) domestic traders described by
(2), (4), (5), (13), (16), (19), (20)-(23), (31), (33),
n  ( ‡ 1 ) foreign traders described by
(3), (6), (7), (14), (15), (24)-(29), (32), (34),
and which has aggregate properties
(8)-(12), (17), (18), (30).
3.5 The equilibrium exchange rate
If we substitute (31)-(34) into aggregate demand function (30), we obtain
F( )
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After rearranging terms we have
Proposition 1 (Equilibrium exchange rate)

















































































































1 1 g w g w
An equilibrium solution is a root of a polynomial in m+n+1 factors of St with a constant. The
polynomial of proposition 1 thanks its convenient form to the variance specifications (33) and (34).
Obviously, the polynomial may have several real-valued roots. In section 3.1 we already mentioned
that the international banking system - knowing the foreign exchange supply and demand schedules
of all traders -  acts as a Walrasian auctioneer to clear the foreign exchange market. We can now be
more specific: in period t the Walrasian auctioneer uses the Newton-Raphson algorithm with initial
value St-1 to compute the nearest real-valued root of the polynomial of proposition 1. Although more17
than one equilibrium exchange rate may exist, we choose the one that is selected by the Walrasian
auctioneer.
For each period t, we can supply empirically plausible numerical values for It, I*t, Zt,i, Z*t,j, at,i,
a*t,j, gt,i, g*t,j, wt,i, w*t,j, A*t,j, Bt,i and compute the equilibrium exchange rate St from proposition
1. This will transform the theoretical model into an artificial economy.
4. The artificial economy
4.1 Number of traders and periods
We will assume that there are 200 traders: m = 100 domestic traders and n = 100 foreign traders.
The length of the experiment is related to the time interpretation. Exchange rates have been floating
since March 1973, hence by the end of 1997 there were 100 quarterly exchange rate observations
under free float. With the use of statistical tables (Dickey-Fuller tests) in mind, we will set the length
of the experiment at 100 periods.
4.2 Initial wealth
The initial currency endowments are obtained in two stages. First we draw domestic and foreign
currency endowments from a uniform distribution. Then we multiply with scale parameters l and l*.
Their relative size reflects the relative sizes of the domestic and foreign economies. These scale
parameters are also drawn from a uniform distribution:18
l~U(0,1)                                                                                                                                 (36)
l*~U(0,1)                                                                                                                               (37)
The initial currency endowments of domestic traders are described by:
A1,i~l.10
5.U[0,1]                                                                                                                     (38)
B1,i~l.10
5.U[0,1]                                                                                                                     (39)
The initial currency endowments of foreign traders are:
A*1,j~l*.10
5.U[0,1]                                                                                                                 (40)
B*1,j~l*.10
5.U[0,1]                                                                                                                 (41)
4.3 Interest rates
We let the domestic interest rate follow a random walk:
It = It-1 + ht                                                                                                                             (42)19
with the (for quarterly interest rates) empirically plausible
ht ~ N(0,10
-5)                                                                                                                           (43)
and an initial value drawn from a uniform distribution, such that the annualized quarterly interest rate
starts at a value between 2% and 10%:
100{(1+I1)
4-1} ~ U[2,10]                                                                                                        (44)
Similarly for foreign interest rates:
I*t = I*t-1 + h*t                                                                                                                         (45)
h*t ~ N(0,10
-5)                                                                                                                         (46)
100{(1+I*1)
4-1} ~ U[2,10]                                                                                                      (47)20
4.4 Risk aversion update
The measure of risk aversion in our model is the absolute risk aversion parameter gt,i. However,
Friend & Blume (1975) and Landskroner (1977) found empirical evidence of constant relative risk
aversion (hence decreasing absolute risk aversion).
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with W0,i =  A1,i + S0 B1,i (S0 = 1). If Wt-1,i > 0, ki is the target value of the relative risk aversion.
Since Wt-1,i is only an approximation of Et,i(Wt+1,i), the actual relative risk aversion
kt,i = Et,i(Wt+1,i) gt,i                                                                                                                  (49)
will hover around ki. If Wt-1,i < 0, update formula (48) ensures a positive absolute risk aversion gt,i,
given a positive ki. In section 3.3 we mentioned that this is required for the second order condition
for the optimal foreign currency position of domestic trader i. Notice that this update implies that the
more negative a trader’s wealth becomes, the more risk he is going to take: in this case we are
dealing with “rogue traders”. In this subsection, we have discussed only the domestic traders, but
similar statements hold for foreign traders.21
4.5 Reinterpretation of risk aversion and predicted variance
In each equation the absolute risk aversion parameter and the predicted variance parameter appear
as a product. For domestic traders this “risk product” is  gt,i wt,i and for foreign traders it is g*t,j
/w*t,j. Hence for the simulation output it is irrelevant whether the risk-adjustment of currency
positions is caused by risk aversion or predicted exchange rate variance. We can exploit this
property to neutralize the effects of second moment expectations Vart,i(St+1) and Var*t,j(1/St+1).
After each experiment we can reinterpret the risk product components such that all traders have
rational second moment expectations. Suppose that a specific experiment generates a sample
variance
( ) Var st D = ~ w                                                                                                                         (50)
Then the predicted variance of domestic trader i coincides with the sample variance if
w w t i , ~ =                                                                                                                                   (51)
However, in general this will not hold for the value of wt,i that we put into the experiment. We can
remedy this by redefining this parameter after the simulation is completed. We have to keep the risk
product of domestic trader i the same:
g w g w t i t i t i , , ,
~ ~ =                                                                                                                        (52)
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In turn this implies a reinterpretation of the relative risk aversion parameter. Since
kt,i = Et,i(Wt+1,i) gt,i                                                                                                                 (54)
and
~ ( )~
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The importance of this post-experiment reinterpretation of risk is that it makes it impossible to
attribute output results to irrationality in the predicted variance (assuming that the generated exchange23
rate series does not exhibit volatility clustering). Having neutralized the second moment expectations
Vart,i(St+1) and Var*t,j(1/St+1), we can attribute all simulation results to the first moment expectations
Et,i(St+1) and E*t,j(1/St+1), which are after all the focus of our experiments.
Landskroner (1977) estimated kt,i between 2.4 and 8.2. Hansen & Singleton (1983)  found values
between 0 and 2. Dunn & Singleton (1986) found values between 1.2 and 3.5. To be safe, we
assume that relative risk aversion is between 0 and 5. We will set the predicted variance at the
empirically observed value (see table 2)
wt,i = 4.10
-3                                                                                                                              (58)
and draw ki from a uniform distribution:
ki ~ U[1,5]                                                                                                                             (59)
After a simulation is completed, we reinterpret the predicted variance and risk aversion parameters
according to (51), (53) and (57). If the average value of  ~
, kt i over all traders and over all periods
exceeds 5, we discard the simulation on the basis of empirically implausible high relative risk
aversion. Although we set the lower boundary of ki at 1 (for numerical reasons), the lower
boundary for ~
, kt i is 0 (as suggested by the empirical evidence).
In this subsection, we concentrated on the domestic traders, but analogous statements hold for
foreign traders.24
4.6 Exchange rate expectations, trader types and market types
We distinguish between 4 types of individual traders, as summarized in table 1. For simplicity, the
descriptions are stated for domestic traders. The corresponding descriptions for foreign traders are
analogous.
Table 1: Types of traders
trader type type of information
Zt,i
use of information at,i expectations mechanism
Et,i(Dst+1)
distributed lag expectations St-1 > 0 - at,i Dst+1
bandwagon expectations St-1 < 0 - at,i Dst+1
adaptive expectations Et-1,i(St) > 0 at,i (Et-1,i(st) - st)
regressive expectations Qt,i > 0 at,i (qt,i - st)
We define S0 = E-1,i[S0] = 1 and we use a random walk to represent the natural logarithm qt of the
“fundamental” exchange rate Qt:
qt = qt-1 + ut                                                                                                                              (60)
ut ~ N(0,w)                                                                                                                              (61)
q1 = 0                                                                                                                                       (62)25
Parameter w is set at the value indicated by equation (58). We will assume that each trader has an
expectations scheme that is fixed over time: Zt,i = Zi and at,i = ai. Based on the 4 types of individual
traders we will consider 5 types of markets (in definitions 2-6 the symbol ai refers to both domestic
and foreign traders):
Definition 2 (Bandwagon expectations market)
A bandwagon expectations market is a heterogeneous traders market which consists of bandwagon
expectations traders with  ai ~ a.LN(-0.125,0.25) and  a< 0.
With y ~ LN(m,s
2) we mean that y = exp(x) with x ~ N(m,s




hence  [ ] ( ) E y a a m s a = + = exp
1
2
2  if s
2 = - 2m.
In other words: if we set s
2 = - 2m, the average alpha is given by a.
We have chosen m = -0.125 and s
2 = 0.25 after inspection of the results with a random number
generator. Large spreads imply implausible individual values for alpha, while small spreads exhibit
implausibly little heterogeneity. The spread of individual values of alpha with m = -0.125 and s
2 =
0.25 seemed appropriate.
Definition 3 (Distributed Lag expectations market)
A distributed lag expectations market is a heterogeneous traders market which consists of distributed
lag expectations traders with ai ~ a.LN(-0.125,0.25) and  a> 0.26
Definition 4 (Extrapolative expectations market)
An extrapolative expectations market is a heterogeneous traders market which consists of
bandwagon and distributed lag expectations traders with ai ~ N(a,0.25).
The variance parameter 0.25 was again selected on the basis of inspection of random number
generator results.
Definition 5 (Adaptive expectations market)
An adaptive expectations market is a heterogeneous traders market which consists of adaptive
expectations traders with ai ~ a.LN(-0.125,0.25) and  a> 0.
Definition 6 (Regressive expectations market)
A regressive expectations market is a heterogeneous traders market which consists of regressive
expectations traders with ai ~ a.LN(-0.125,0.25) and  a> 0.
In each of the markets described by definitions 2-6, the traders use the same type of information Zt
to form exchange rate expectations Et,i(St+1). However, they are heterogeneous in the way that they
use the information. The individual expectations parameter ai, which indicates the weight that is being
given to the information Zt, is drawn from a distribution around a, which in turn indicates how the
“average” trader uses the information Zt.27
5. The experiments
5.1 Experimental design
In section 4 we transformed the theoretical model of section 3 into an artificial economy with a
flexible specification of the exchange rate expectations mechanisms of individual traders. We defined
5 market types, corresponding with different exchange rate expectations mechanisms. With each
market type, we will perform experiments that can be depicted in figure 2:
Figure 2: The experiment
                         pre-exchange currency positions: At,i , Bt,i , A*t,j , B*t,j
                                        interest rate time series: It , I*t
                                         risk aversion parameters: gt,i ,g*t,j
                                    predicted variance parameters: wt,i , w*t,j
                                  expectations formation: at,i , zt,i , a*t,j , z*t,j
                                                          input
                       model of foreign exchange between heterogeneous traders
                                                        output
                                           exchange rate time series: st
                                 exchange rate expectations: Et,i(st+1), E*t,j(st+1)28
We described the input of the experiment in section 4 and the model of foreign exchange between
heterogeneous traders in section 3. In this section we will discuss the output and investigate if there is
a relationship with specific input.
5.2 Empirically plausible output
We want to evaluate the output of the experiments, in particular the artificial exchange rate series, on
their empirical plausibility. This requires investigating the stylized facts of empirically observed
quarterly exchange rates. Apart from the first 4 moments of Dst, we look at 4 test statistics that are
inspired by the (weak-form) efficient market hypothesis and the statistical phenomena of volatility
clusters and fat tails.
Under weak-form market efficiency, the (log) exchange rate st reflects all information contained in
the lagged exchange rates st-1, st-2, . . . (see for example Baillie & McMahon (1989)). Consider the
univariate model
st = l st-1 + et                                                                                                                         (63)
where et is an error term. If we take expectations conditional on the lagged exchange rates, we
obtain
Et-1[st] = l st-1 + Et-1[et]                                                                                                            (64)29
or equivalently
Et-1[Dst] = (l-1) st-1 + Et-1[et]                                                                                                    (65)
Under weak-form market efficiency, it should hold that Et-1[Dst] = 0. This implies that l = 1 and that
et should not contain serial correlation. In other words, st should follow a martingale process. These
properties can be tested with a Dickey-Fuller unit root test on st and a Box-Pierce Q-test for serial
correlation in Dst.
Among the stylized facts of high frequency exchange rates are volatility clusters and fat tails (de Vries
(1995)). We verify whether these properties are retained for low frequency data such as our
quarterly exchange rates. We will test for volatility clusters by performing a Box-Pierce Q-test for
serial correlation in (Dst)
2. We test for fat tails with a Jarque-Bera test for normality of  Dst. The
results are described in table 2:30
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var(x) is variance of x, skew(x) is skewness of x, kurt(x) is kurtosis of x
DF(x) is Dickey-Fuller test statistic (H0: x contains unit root) which has tabulated critical values
BP8(x) is Box-Pierce test statistic (H0: first 8 autocorrelations of x are zero) which is c
2(8) under H0
JB(x) is Jarque-Bera test statistic (H0: x is normally distributed) which is c
2(2) under H0
p-values of BP- and JB-test statistics between parentheses
Data source: Main Economic Indicators, various issues
First consider the results on weak-form market efficiency. The Dickey-Fuller test indicates a unit
root for 15 out of the 16 exchange rates at the 5% significance level and for all exchange rates at the
2.5% significance level (see Fuller (1976), table 8.5.2). The Box-Pierce Q-tests indicate the absence31
of serial correlation in Dst for only 9 out of the 16 exchange rates at the usual 10% significance level,
12 out of 16 at the 5% level and 14 out of 16 at the 1% level. Since the significance level indicates
the probability of mistakenly accepting the presence of serial correlation, strong believers in weak-
form market efficiency may still interpret the DF(s) and BP8(Ds) results as evidence of weak-form
market efficiency. However, it seems more sensible to interpret the results as an indication that
quarterly exchange rates are close to a martingale process, while exhibiting some serial correlation.
For our purposes, i.e. the comparison of statistical properties of artificial data with those of empirical
data, this discussion is not very important: we are more interested in the range of values that the test
statistics assume. Therefore we will call DF(s) > -1.95 (the usual 5% significance level) and BP8(Ds)
< 22.55 (corresponding with a nice round p-value of 4.10
-3) empirically plausible output.
Now we look at the results on volatility clustering. The BP8(Ds
2)  tests indicate the absence of
volatility clustering for all exchange rates. This result confirms the results of Baillie & Bollerslev
(1989), who found that ARCH effects in daily and weekly exchange rates seem to disappear for
monthly exchange rates. Hence for empirically plausible output we require BP8(Ds
2) < 13.36, the
usual 10% significance level.
Finally we consider the results on normality: the JB(Ds) test statistics indicate normality for only 11
out of 16 exchange rates at the 5% significance level and 13 out of 16 at the 1% significance level.
Hence normally distributed exchange rate returns do not seem to be a stylized fact even for quarterly
data. The highest JB(Ds) value is 24.48. Therefore for empirically plausible output we require JB(Ds)
< 24.86, which corresponds with a p-value of 4.10
-6. We summarize the results in definition 7:32
Definition 7 (Empirically plausible output)
An artificial economy generates empirically plausible output, if the simulated (log) exchange rate
series st has the following statistical properties:
DF(s) > -1.95




The first two properties of definition 4 correspond with a process that approximates a martingale: an
exact martingale is characterized by BP8(Ds) < 13.36. The economic interpretation of such a process
is approximate weak-form efficiency. The third property adds the restriction that volatility clustering
is absent. The fourth property reflects an upper limit for the fatness of the tails that we have found for
empirically observed quarterly exchange rates. The tail fatness is positively related to the occurrence
of extreme exchange rate returns in the sample. In the next subsection we will use this criterion to
evaluate the experimental output.33
5.3 Simulation results
We simulate all market types with m = 100 domestic traders and n = 100 foreign traders. Each
market type is characterized by the type of information Z and the use of information a. With respect
to the type of information, we distinguish between adaptive expectations markets, bandwagon
expectations markets, distributed lag expectations markets, extrapolative expectations markets and
regressive expectations markets. At the same time, we consider different values for the “average”
use of information a. For each market type we perform 100 simulations of each 100 periods and
we count the number of time series which can be identified as martingales, martingales without
volatility clustering, random walks and empirically plausible time series.34
For the adaptive expectations market, we consider the following values of the average a: a= 0.05,
0.10, 0.15, 0.20, 0.25, 0.30. Empirical estimates of a range from 0.07 to 0.19 (Frankel & Froot
(1987a) and (1987b), Cavaglia, Verschoor & Wolff (1993)). The simulation results are reported in
table 3:
Table 3: Adaptive expectations markets (100 simulations)
average a martingales
DF(st)        > - 1.95
BP8(Dst)    <  13.36
martingales without
volatility clustering
DF(st)        > - 1.95
BP8(Dst)    <  13.36
BP8(Dst
2)   <  13.36
random walks
DF(st)        > - 1.95
BP8(Dst)    <  13.36
BP8(Dst
2)   <  13.36
JB(Dst)      <    5.99
empirically plausible
DF(st)        >  - 1.95
BP8(Dst)     <  22.55
BP8(Dst
2)    <  13.36
JB(Dst)       <  24.86
0.05     0     0     0     0
0.10     0     0     0     0
0.15     0     0     0     0
0.20     5     4     0     0
0.25     8     8     0     0
0.30     6     6     0     0
The results indicate that adaptive expectations markets with empirically plausible values of a are
incapable of generating empirically plausible exchange rates. In a small number of cases the adaptive
expectations market is able to produce a martingale process. However, in these cases the Jarque-
Bera test statistics are far too high (not lower than 2026.36) in comparison with empirical results.
Although adaptive expectations markets are sometimes weak-form efficient and exhibit no volatility-
clustering, they generate too many extreme returns to be empirically plausible.35
For the bandwagon expectations market, we consider the following values of the average a:
a= -0.25, -0.20, -0.15, -0.10, -0.05. Empirical estimates of a for extrapolative expectations
range from -0.07 to 0.58 (Frankel & Froot (1987a) and (1987b), Bank of Japan (1989), Froot &
Frankel (1990), Cavaglia, Verschoor & Wolff (1993)). The results are reported in table 4:
Table 4: Bandwagon expectations markets (100 simulations)
average a martingales
DF(st)        > - 1.95
BP8(Dst)    <  13.36
martingales without
volatility clustering
DF(st)        > - 1.95
BP8(Dst)    <  13.36
BP8(Dst
2)   <  13.36
random walks
DF(st)        > - 1.95
BP8(Dst)    <  13.36
BP8(Dst
2)   <  13.36
JB(Dst)      <    5.99
empirically plausible
DF(st)         >  - 1.95
BP8(Dst)     <  22.55
BP8(Dst
2)    <  13.36
JB(Dst)       <  24.86
- 0.25     0     0     0     0
- 0.20     0     0     0     0
- 0.15     0     0     0     0
- 0.10     0     0     0     0
- 0.05     0     0     0     0
The bandwagon expectations market performs even worse than the adaptive expectations market.
For each of the 5 parameter values, there is not a single simulation that generates an exchange rate
series that passes the four tests of empirical plausibility. The main deficiency of bandwagon
expectations markets is that they are not weak-form efficient, which means that the most recent
exchange rate return contains information on the direction and size of the next exchange rate change.36
For the distributed lag expectations market, we consider 6 values of the average a:
a= 0.10, 0.20, 0.30, 0.40, 0.50, 0.60. We just mentioned that the empirical estimates of a for
extrapolative expectations range from -0.07 to 0.58. The results are reported in table 5:
Table 5: Distributed Lag expectations markets (100 simulations)
average a martingales
DF(st)        > - 1.95
BP8(Dst)    <  13.36
martingales without
volatility clustering
DF(st)        > - 1.95
BP8(Dst)    <  13.36
BP8(Dst
2)   <  13.36
random walks
DF(st)        > - 1.95
BP8(Dst)    <  13.36
BP8(Dst
2)   <  13.36
JB(Dst)      <    5.99
empirically plausible
DF(st)         >  - 1.95
BP8(Dst)]    <  22.55
BP8(Dst
2)    <  13.36
JB(Dst)       <  24.86
0.10     0     0     0     0
0.20     0     0     0     0
0.30     0     0     0     0
0.40     0     0     0     0
0.50     0     0     0     0
0.60     0     0     0     0
The distributed lag expectations market suffers from the same problem as the bandwagon
expectations market: the exchange rate process is predictable (in a linear sense). Notice that these
two expectations mechanisms are mirror images of each other.37
The extrapolative expectations market contains both bandwagon and distributed lag expectations
traders. For this market, we consider 10 values of the average a:
a= -0.20, -0.10, 0.00, 0.10, 0.20, 0.30, 0.40 0.50, 0.60, 0.70. The empirically observed range [-
0.07,0.58] is contained in this spectrum. The results are reported in table 6:
Table 6: Extrapolative expectations markets (100 simulations)
average a martingales
DF(st)        > - 1.95
BP8(Dst)    <  13.36
martingales without
volatility clustering
DF(st)        > - 1.95
BP8(Dst)    <  13.36
BP8(Dst
2)   <  13.36
random walks
DF(st)        > - 1.95
BP8(Dst)    <  13.36
BP8(Dst
2)   <  13.36
JB(Dst)      <    5.99
empirically plausible
DF(st)       >  - 1.95
BP8(Dst)    <  22.55
BP8(Dst
2)   <  13.36
JB(Dst)      <  24.86
- 0.20   40   38     0     0
- 0.10   56   53     0     0
  0.00   66   61     0     0
  0.10   66   62     0     0
  0.20   62   56     0     0
  0.30   54   54     0     0
  0.40   47   41     0     0
  0.50   43   40     0     0
  0.60   43   41     0     0
  0.70   27   25     0     0
The presence of both types of traders considerably improves weak-form market efficiency,
especially in the [-0.1,0.3] region, where more than half of the simulations follow a martingale
process without volatility clusters. This performance is also much better than for adaptive
expectations markets. However, the simulated extrapolative expectations markets which exhibit
weak-form market efficiency generate too many extreme exchange rate returns to be empirically38
plausible. As a matter of fact, only 1% of all simulations have a Jarque-Bera test statistic below
24.86.
For the regressive expectations market, we consider 10 values of the average a:
a= 0.01, 0.02, 0.03, 0.04, 0.05, 0.06, 0.07, 0.08, 0.09, 0.10. The empirically observed
nonnegative  parameters a for regressive expectations are 0.02 and 0.09 (Frankel & Froot (1987a)
and (1987b), Bank of Japan (1989), Froot & Frankel (1990)). The results are reported in table 7:
Table 7: Regressive expectations markets (100 simulations)
average a martingales
DF(st)        > - 1.95
BP8(Dst)    <  13.36
martingales without
volatility clustering
DF(st)        > - 1.95
BP8(Dst)    <  13.36
BP8(Dst
2)   <  13.36
random walks
DF(st)        > - 1.95
BP8(Dst)    <  13.36
BP8(Dst
2)   <  13.36
JB(Dst)      <    5.99
empirically plausible
DF(st)        >  - 1.95
BP8(Dst)     <  22.55
BP8(Dst
2)    <  13.36
JB(Dst)       <  24.86
0.01   52   36   27   43
0.02   59   47   38   54
0.03   67   50   36   54
0.04   59   51   44   58
0.05   67   56   44   63
0.06   76   64   50   64
0.07   59   45   33   49
0.08   62   48   39   57
0.09   61   47   38   54
0.10   55   39   29   42
The regressive expectations market is the only market that is able to generate empirically plausible
exchange rate series. The performance is best for a= 0.05-0.06, which is in the middle area of the39
range of empirical estimates. For these average expectations parameter values, regressive
expectations markets generate empirically plausible exchange rate series in more than 60 of the 100
simulations. In other words, for about 60% of the “states of the world” (as represented by the
artificial distributions of initial currency endowments, interest rates, risk aversion and expectations
parameters) the regressive expectations market seems to be a plausible representation of the foreign
exchange market.
Notice that the regressive expectations market is only marginally better than the extrapolative
expectations market in generating exchange rate processes which are weak-form efficient and free of
volatility clusters: the averages are 48.3 and 47.1 respectively. The crucial difference is that the tails
of the distribution of exchange rate returns are considerably less fat in case of the regressive
expectations market than in case of the extrapolative expectations market. In other words, the
occurrence of extreme exchange rate returns in the regressive expectations market is comparable
with empirical markets.
It should be kept in mind that regressive expectations may take several forms. The survey data
studies considered purchasing power parity, some constant long run exchange rate level and a
moving average of the exchange rate. For the artificial economies we simply generated a random
walk and presented it as the fundamental exchange rate. Of course, this is interesting in itself. Even if
this random walk has no relationship at all with the “fundamentals” in the economy, the artificial
foreign exchange market exhibits the same statistical behavior as empirical currency markets. In other
words: the relevant issue is that traders believe in a fundamental exchange rate, it does not seem to40
matter what the fundamental exchange rate is based on. The “fundamental exchange rate” may be as
fictitious as the perceived patterns in the “charts”.
6. Conclusion
A clear picture emerges from the simulations: artificial economies with “technical” expectations
schemes (adaptive, bandwagon, distributed lag, extrapolative) do not generate exchange rate series
with statistical properties that match those of empirically observed exchange rates. Bandwagon,
distributed lag and adaptive expectations markets are rarely weak-form efficient. Extrapolative
expectations markets are frequently weak-form efficient and free of volatility clusters, but generate
too many extreme returns compared with empirical foreign exchange markets. The artificial
economies with “fundamentalist” expectations schemes perform considerably better. Regressive
expectations markets generate empirically plausible exchange rate series in about 40 to 60 of the 100
simulations, depending on the average a. The simulations with the artificial foreign exchange market
therefore suggest that regressive expectations are the most plausible representation of quarterly
exchange rate expectations, when compared with extrapolative, bandwagon, distributed lag and
adaptive expectations. The (perceived) presence of an ‘anchor’ seems to play an important role in
the functioning of foreign exchange markets, determining the frequency of extreme exchange rate
returns.
In this paper we performed experiments with artificial markets consisting of traders which are
heterogeneous with respect to initial endowments and risk aversion. However, in each simulated41
market all traders base their exchange rate expectations on the same type of information z. The
expectations are heterogeneous because of individual differences in the use of information, as
expressed by the weight a. In other words, the artificial markets exhibit “weak-form heterogeneity”
with respect to expectations. This form of heterogeneity is appropriate for a comparison with survey
data studies on exchange rate expectations, such as Frankel & Froot (1987a). It allowed us to
investigate the plausibility of adaptive, bandwagon, distributed lag, extrapolative and regressive
expectations markets. The next step is to perform experiments with markets consisting of, for
example, both “chartists” (extrapolative traders) and “fundamentalists” (regressive expectations
traders).
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